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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR
PREGNANT WORKERS: CALIFORNIA
FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION
V. GUERRA
I. INTRODUCTION
Will a woman lose her place on the ladder of employment advance-
ment if she becomes pregnant and takes maternity leave? Pregnant wo-
men historically have been affected by one of two common employment
policies. One policy provides no leave at all, often forcing the employee
into voluntary or mandatory resignation; the other policy imposes
mandatory unpaid leave during pregnancy and after childbirth.' The
usual result of pregnancy is the loss of employment or, at the least, a
temporary loss of income.2 If the employer grants a leave of absence,
there is seldom a guarantee of reinstatement; consequently, seniority and
fringe benefits are lost. Three major assumptions form the basis for these
policies: (1) women are temporary, marginal workers who will not re-
turn to employment after achieving their primary maternal role;3 (2) wo-
men must be excluded from the hazards of the workplace for protection
during childbearing and child-rearing;4 and (3) a woman's income is
1. See S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING
WOMEN 35-38 (1983) [hereinafter MATERNITY POLICIES).
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 33-35. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 448-53 (1978-79). Two facts characterize
women's status in the American labor market:
1) Female workers, especially working class women, tend to be segregated into a relatively
small number of female-dominated occupations.
2) Women tend to occupy positions in the "secondary labor market," which is characterized
by lack of provisions for job security, fringe benefits, or union representation.
4. Part of the rationale for denying employment to the pregnant woman stemmed from the
idea that she needed protection and needed to stay home to care for the new child. Employment
rules protecting pregnant women were similar to earlier protective state legislation requiring special
conditions for working women on the premise that they were "more fragile than men" or "in greater
need of moral guidance." E. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 81
(1986) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN FAMILY]. These pregnancy laws kept women from taking jobs
1
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dispensable.
These assumptions are an attempt to justify mandatory leave or res-
ignation, but they cannot be justified in today's economic environment.
For women who are the sole family support, earned income is crucial.
Working wives contribute twenty-six percent of family income; women
working full time throughout the year contribute thirty-nine percent of
the family income.' In June, 1987, over seventy percent of civilian wo-
men in the peak childbearing years, nineteen to thirty-four, were em-
ployed.6 Furthermore, forty-eight percent of all mothers with children
under one year old work, and sixty-seven percent of mothers with chil-
dren under three years old work full time.' As these figures show, ex-
cluding mothers from the workplace would financially burden a
substantial number of American families.
Following the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Cali-
fornia Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra (Cal. Fed),I employ-
ers in states with statutes that require maternity leave and reinstatement
to the same or similar position must give pregnant women these statutory
benefits. Because the Court found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII)9 did not conflict with the California statute,"° a
that often had higher salaries, or they required special treatment which made it undesirable for
employers to hire them. Like protective laws, pregnancy rules often subordinated women to men,
eliminated job competition, and reinforced patriarchal social structures. Id. See also Boris &
Bardiaglio, The Transformation of Patriarchy: The Historic Role of the State, in FAMILIES, POLITICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 80 (I. Diamond, ed. 1983). See B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A.
PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 208-19 (1977) for a discussion of "protective" laws that
have a discriminatory effect on women by making it difficult for them to obtain high-paying, desira-
ble jobs.
5. MATERNITY POLICIES, supra note 1, at 10. Women have historically provided essential
economic support for themselves and their families. J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE
JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 21-22 (1978).
6. "Employment and Earnings," U.S. Dep't of Labor (July 1987). More than 50 percent of
wives from ages 25 to 34 work full time throughout the year. MATERNITY POLICIES, supra note 1,
at 10.
7. Press, McDaniel & Wright, "A New Family Issue," NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1987, at 22. See
also THE AMERICAN FAMILY, supra note 4, at 21-22, quoting a 1984-85 report of Family Service
America:
1. The traditional nuclear family with the husband working to support his dependent wife
and children has become the exception rather than the rule and is now typical of fewer
than 10 percent of all households.
3. The number of working women is increasing, and if trends continue, men and women
will soon be in the labor force in equal numbers. Married women including those with
young children are now more likely than not to be employed,
Id. It is predicted that by 1990 women will make up more than 50 percent of the workforce.
Silverman, Re-examining Maternity Leave, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, April 12, 1985, at 35.
8. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1982).
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woman's right to retain her position is secure in California and in the
other states with similar legislation or regulations.11 Several other states
which do not specify reinstatement or job status do provide some guaran-
tee to pregnant workers by prohibiting policies that have an adverse im-
pact on women.
12
Because it is necessary to ensure that the workplace gives equal op-
portunities to working women, the Supreme Court in Cal Fed upheld a
state's right to enact and enforce laws affirming a benefit to pregnant
employees.13 California's affirmative statute is not preempted by federal
legislation because it does not conflict with Title VII14 The statute
reduces the disparate impact that inadequate maternity leave policies
have on female workers."1 Because the statute does not discriminate, but
serves to achieve equality of employment opportunity, taking sex differ-
ences into account is justifiable. 6
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Lillian Garland, a receptionist for California Federal Savings and
Loan Association, took a four-month pregnancy disability leave in Janu-
ary, 1982.17 The following April, after recovering from a caesarean sec-
tion, 18 she requested reinstatement to her job, but neither her old job nor
any receptionist or similar position was available.19 The financial institu-
tion did not reinstate Ms. Garland in a receptionist position until seven
months later.20
10. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
11. The states with legislation requiring reinstatement after maternity leave are Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Montana. Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Washington impose a
reinstatement requirement by regulation or guidelines from state antidiscrimination statutes. Rein-
statement may be implied in Wisconsin. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences Into Ac-
count, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 699, 720-32 & nn.93, 95 & 148 (1985). For the relevant citations, text
of provisions, and discussion of regulations, see infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
12. The states are Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island.
Dowd, supra note 11, at 732. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
13. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 694-95.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1982); see infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
17. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1985).
18. Rust, Maternity Leave: Caught in the Crossfire, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 52. Caesarean
section is a surgical incision made through the uterus and abdominal wall to extract a fetus. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 186 (1969).
19. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
20. Id. at n.7. During the seven months before reinstatement to her job, she was evicted from
her apartment because she had no money with which to pay her rent. As a result, she had to sleep on
19871
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California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)21 prohibits
employment discrimination. Section 12945(b)(2) of the FEHA requires
employers to provide female employees with unpaid pregnancy disability
leave.22 The Fair Employment and Housing Commission has construed
this section to require reinstatement of an employee returning from preg-
nancy leave to her previous job "unless it is no longer available due to
business necessity."'23 If the job is not available, the employer must make
a good faith effort to place the returning employee in a similar position.
Title VII similarly prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy.24  When the Savings and Loan failed to reinstate Ms.
Garland upon her request, she filed a complaint with the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission. The Commissioner charged the finan-
cial institution with violating § 12945(b)(2).2 5 The Savings and Loan
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the stat-
ute26 in federal district court, claiming that § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent
with and preempted by Title VII.27 The district court granted the Sav-
ings and Loan's motion for summary judgment, holding that Title VII
preempts § 12945(b)(2) because it "[d]iscriminat[es] against males" 28 by
a female friend's sofa. Because she had no resources to care for the baby, she lost custody to the
child's father. Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is it Leave Indeed? New York Times, July 22, 1984, § 3, at
1, col. 5.
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
22. Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 392. California Federal Savings & Loan, based in Los Angeles, is a
federally chartered savings and loan association. As an employer of more than 15 employees, it is
covered by federal law (Title VII) as well as California state law (§ 12945(b)(2)). Cal Fed's leave
policy is facially neutral and permits workers with a minimum of three months of employment to
take unpaid leaves for various reasons, including disability and pregnancy. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at
687-88 (1987).
Section 12945(b)(2) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification:
(b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions...
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; pro-
vided, such period shall not exceed four months.... Reasonable period of time means that
period during which the female employee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.... An employer may require any employee who plans to
take a leave pursuant to this subdivision to give the employer reasonable notice of the date
such leave shall commence and the estimated duration of such leave.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
23. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 687.
24. Id.
25. Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 392.
26. Id. at 392-93. The Merchants and Manufacturing Association and the California Chamber
of Commerce joined in the suit. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
27. Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 393.
28. Id. at 396.
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss1/3
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT-PREGNANT WORKERS
requiring preferential treatment of female employees disabled by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.2 9
B. Holding
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's de-
cision30 and found no preemption under Title VII as amended by the
Pregnancy Disability Act (PDA).31 The court of appeals determined
that the PDA sets a minimum for pregnancy disability benefits and that
the California statute simply furthers the goal of equal employment op-
portunity for women.32 The United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that Title VII
does not preempt the California statute.33
C. Issue
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether Title VII
preempts a state statute that requires employers to provide leave and re-
instatement to pregnant employees.34
III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196431 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of sex.3 6 Section 703(a)(1) of the Act makes
it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....37 Even though the Supreme Court has not recognized sex as
a "suspect classification" under the equal protection clause of the Consti-
tution,38 sex is as significant under Title VII as race and national origin,
29. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
30. Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 397.
31. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (1982) [hereinafter PDA].
32. Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 396.
33. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 695.
34. Id at 686.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (1982) [hereinafter Title VII].
36. Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
37. Id
38. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, four Justices in the plural-
ity opinion designated sex as a "suspect classification," but the four concurring and one dissenting
Justice disagreed. Subsequently, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975), the Justices
who viewed sex similar to race in Frontiero withdrew from their position. The absence of the race-
1987]
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which the Supreme Court has classified as "suspect. '39  Because the
Court has hesitated to label classifications based on sex as "suspect,"
claims of sex discrimination in maternity policies have been more suc-
cessful under Title VII than under equal protection claims of sex
discrimination. 4'
Discriminatory employment practices under Title VII have gener-
ally been established under one of two theories: disparate treatment or
disparate impact.41 Disparate treatment is patent discrimination against
a protected Title VII class; the employer openly treats certain employees
less favorably than he treats others.42 To establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment, the employee must prove that the employer had dis-
criminatory motives.43 Evidence of discrimination is "virtually impossi-
ble to produce,"" however, so motive is usually inferred from
comparative differences in treatment of similarly situated persons of an-
other group.45
The disparate impact theory evolved in response to the Court's
changing view of discrimination and its recognition that discrimination
often results from systems inherent in various employment policies.46
sex analogy from the Court's opinion signaled that a different approach would be needed for the
attack on sex discrimination. M. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMEN, 17-18 (1980).
39. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.5 (3d ed. 1986).
40. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Court used only the rational basis
test and found that the exclusion of pregnancy and childbirth disabilities from a state's employee
disability benefits program was justified based on cost and an overall plan of employee contributions.
Id. at 497. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), however, the Court found
that the school board's mandatory leave rules bore no rational relationship to the state's interest in
continuity of instruction and invalidated the provisions. Id. at 643, 647-48. Because the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments permits constitutional challenges only against employ-
ers with some state nexus, private sector employees relied on Title VII's prohibition of discrimina-
tion by employers with 15 or more employees. Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination Amendment to Title VII. Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 591, 593
& n. 12 (1982). See also Thomas, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee Disability Benefit
Programs: Title VII and Equal Protection Clause Analysis, 60 OR. L. REV. 249, 251-57 (1981); Erick-
son, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 83 (1979).
41. See Note, Sex Discrimination: Theories and Defenses under Title VII and Bunvell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 83 W. VA. L. REv. 605, 609-12 (1981) [hereinafter Theories and Defenses]; Erickson,
supra, note 40, at 84-94.
42. Theories and Defenses, supra note 41, at 609. Groups with a common characteristic, such
as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, constitute a protected class under Title VII.
43. Id.
44. Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292
(9th Cir. 1974).
45. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 82-84 (1983).
46. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)). The Court in Lau recognized that discrimination is a
social phenomenon that is molded by legislation. The effects of the legislation may demand due
consideration to the uniqueness of "disadvantaged" individuals. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 & n.9.
6
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The Supreme Court initially articulated the disparate impact theory of
discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.47 and held that a discrimina-
tory motive was not essential to a Title VII case.4 8 Therefore, in addition
to prohibiting overt discrimination, Title VII also proscribes facially neu-
tral policies that have a discriminatory effect on only one protected class
of employees when the policies cannot be justified as a business neces-
sity.49 As a result, if an employee establishes that a neutral practice sta-
tistically disadvantages her protected class, the employer may respond by
showing that the challenged practice is a business necessity.
50
Sex discrimination under Title VII encompasses employment dis-
crimination based on pregnancy. 1 Therefore, under a classical Title VII
analysis, the validity of maternity leave statutes depends "on whether the
statutes require disparate treatment or have a disparate impact on the
basis of sex by mandating employment policies that solely benefit wo-
men."52 Alternatively, statutory validity may depend on the application
of general principles of discrimination in Title VII law.53 The primary
consideration is whether the statute furthers Title VII's goal of achieving
equal employment opportunity. 4
47. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
48. Id. at 432. The Court stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures... that... are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
49. Id. at 431. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977). The Court stated:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims ... [of] "disparate
impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treat-
ment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not
required under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. Title VII prohibits conditioning employment on diploma and test requirements unrelated to job
success when they serve to exclude blacks. Title VII's purpose is to achieve "equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
50. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) (if employee
establishes prima facie case, employer must give legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for practice);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (statistical showing of disproportionate impact need
not be based on applicants).
51. In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission equated maternity with tempo-
rary disability for purposes of sick leave or temporary disability benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10
(1986).
52. Dowd, supra note 11, at 742-43 (footnotes omitted). Dowd takes the position that if preg-
nancy is recognized as a disability which is unique to women, then men and women are not similarly
situated with respect to employment disabilities and risks. Therefore, neither sex suffers disparate
treatment from pregnancy benefits. Id.
53. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII analysis directed mainly
toward consequences of employment practices that discriminated against blacks based on claimed
business necessity); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (comparing the prima facie
showing with an ultimate factual finding of discrimination).
54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
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B. Federal Circuit Court Decisions
Federal courts during the 1970's based their decisions on the dispa-
rate impact theory advocated in Griggs." Accordingly, the courts that
considered the maternity leave issue under Title VII invalidated disabil-
ity plans without benefits for pregnant workers because such plans had a
disparate impact on women.56 For example, in Satty v. Nashville Gas
Co.,17 the Sixth Circuit looked to the EEOC regulations for guidance5" in
determining the validity of the gas company's disability policy under Ti-
tle VII.59 The court stated that the principal aim of Title VII is to elimi-
nate artificial distinctions which further disparate treatment without a
compelling reason for the disparity.60 Consequently, the Satty court
found that the policy's disparate treatment of pregnant employees vio-
lated Title VII.6'
55. Id. at 424.
56. The circuit courts disregarded the Supreme Court's constitutionally-based decisions as in-
applicable to Title VII pregnancy discrimination cases. See Communications Workers v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dep't, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy-related
disability benefit plans are forbidden under Title VII), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977), and remanded
in light of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975) (private employer's income protection plan which excluded pregnancy
benefits but included other disabilities and which limited pregnancy leave to three months without
termination violated Title VII), vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737
(1976); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy-related
disability benefits from employee benefit program violated Title VII), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
57. 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
58. The EEOC administers Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1986) provides in part:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from em-
ployment applicants or employees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical con-
ditions is in prima facie violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or
contributed to by other medical conditions, under any health or disability insurance or sick
leave plan available in connection with employment. Written or unwritten employment
policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave,
the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges,
reinstatement, and payment under any health or disability insurance or sick leave plan,
formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
disabilities.
Id.
59. Satty, 522 F.2d at 854. Under the company policy, an employee retained job-bidding sen-
iority following absence from work due to a nonwork-related disability, but an employee taking
maternity leave did not. Similarly, vacation time could be applied to pregnancy-related absences but
sick leave could not. Id. at 851-52.
60. Id at 855.
61. Id. at 854. The Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the sex-neutral approach advocated by the
Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the Court stated that "[w]hile it is
true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification ...." Id. at 496 n.20. One commentator has
characterized this statement as the Court's "Alice-in-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a sex-neutral
8
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Despite using similar methods of analysis, the circuit courts were
divided on which types of pregnancy-based discrimination established
sex discrimination. Some courts used the bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation (BFOQ) defense standard to rebut pregnancy-based employment
distinctions showing disparate treatment of an entire class.6" Other
courts used the business necessity standard in determining whether a
facially neutral practice had a disparate impact on a protected group.63
The Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert I debated the sex-
discriminatory impact of an employment policy on pregnancy, and the
controversial decision reversed the effect of many of the circuit court de-
cisions that upheld pregnant workers' rights.
C. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
The Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert65 squarely ad-
dressed the issue of whether the exclusion of pregnancy coverage from a
company disability plan constitutes sex discrimination. Certain female
employees brought a class action suit charging that the company disabil-
ity plan violated Title VII because it excluded coverage of all pregnancy-
related disabilities.66 Relying on its reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello,67 the
Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits was not a "mere
phenomenon .... ." Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 54 n.304 (1977),
62. To establish a BFOQ defense, the restrictive policy must be "reasonably necessary" to the
employer's business and the employer must factually establish that substantially all pregnant women
would be unable to perform their duties. See Wald, supra note 40, at 608-09. For examples of the
employer BFOQ defense, see Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (being a female not a BFOQ for the position of flight attendant); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (in order to invoke the BFOQ defense,
the employer must prove that he had a factual basis for believing that women would be unable to
perform the job of telephone switchman).
63. Business necessity must be established by evidence that the challenged practice is:
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business .... [T]he challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential...
impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (foot-
notes omitted). Some employers relied on the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) excep-
tion in section 703(e) of Title VII.
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Evidence presented in the district court stressed the cost factor of implementing additional
benefits for pregnancy and indicated that the inclusion of a pregnancy disability benefits plan would
increase GE's cost by a large but indeterminable amount. Id. at 131 & n.10 (citing Gilbert v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 378 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
67. Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
9
Stewart: Equal Employment Opportunity for Pregnant Workers: California Fed
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:77
pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the mem-
bers of one sex .... ,68 Failing to find gender-based effects necessary to
prove a Title VII discrimination class action case, the court found that
the company plan was merely an insurance policy which covered some
risks but excluded others.69 The court based its finding on the assump-
tion that employees can be divided into two groups-pregnant women
and non-pregnant persons.70 Moreover, it found that the EEOC guide-
lines on pregnancy disability benefits 71 which were to be included in in-
surance plans lacked the force of law72 and actually conflicted with Title
VII's concept of discrimination.7" Gilbert thus established that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex did not include discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy. 74
Congress enacted the Pregnancy Disability Act in 1978,75 thereby
expressly rejecting the Gilbert decision and adopting the Gilbert dissent
as a correct interpretation of Title VII.76 Justice Brennan's dissent fo-
cused on the discriminatory effect of General Electric's disability pro-
gram on women. 77  The program insured against all male-specific
disabilities, and it covered all female-specific disabilities except preg-
nancy, which is the most prevalent female-specific disability. 78 Justice
Brennan also found that the 1972 EEOC guidelines represented eight
68. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20). The Fourth Circuit
majority in Gilbert concluded that Geduldig did not control because the Geduldig decision was based
on the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and not on Title VII. Id. at 132-33 (noting
Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 666-67 (4th Cir. 1975)). The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
69. Id. at 138. The court found that pregnancy, although confined to women, was significantly
different from the typical covered disability or disease and was often voluntarily undertaken. Conse-
quently, the Court would not infer that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits from the com-
pany plan was a pretext for discriminating against women; therefore, the plan was not gender-based.
Id. at 136.
70. Id. at 135. See Karst, supra note 61.
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1986).
72. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484 (1942)).
73. Id. at 142. The Court found that the EEOC guideline was promulgated eight years after
Title VII's enactment and actually contradicted the agency's opinion letter to General Electric dated
October 17, 1966. The letter stated: "a company's group insurance program which covers hospital
and medical expenses for the delivery of employees' children, but excludes . . . those disabilities
which result from pregnancy and childbirth would not be in violation of Title VII." Id.
74. Id. at 133-40.
75. PDA, supra note 31.
76. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749, 4750 [hereinafter PDA Legislative
History].
77. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan denied the characterization of preg-
nancy as voluntary because General Electric had not eliminated other voluntary disabilities from its
10
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years of conscientious deliberations and deserved "great deference."79 In
addition, the dissent stated, the 1972 guidelines were consistent with pre-
vious congressional enactments." Enacting the PDA, Congress con-
curred with Brennan's position and found no conflict between the EEOC
guidelines and Title VII's concept of discrimination.81
D. The Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978
Because it feared that working women would be adversely affected
by the Court's holding in Gilbert, Congress amended Title VII by enact-
ing the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978 (PDA). 2 Congress' specific
purpose was to insure that working women are protected against all
forms of employment discrimination based on sex.83 The PDA clarifies
the definition of sex discrimination to include discrimination "on the ba-
sis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."84 The sec-
ond clause of the Act states that women affected by pregnancy-related
plan, i.e., sports injuries, attempted suicides, venereal disease, cosmetic surgery, and disabilities in-
curred in a fight or commission of a crime. Id at 151 (citing Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661, 665 (4th Cir. 1975)).
79. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While opinion letters issued by the
EEOC during the eight-year period between enactment of Title VII and the finalized guidelines
denied liability to employers, the final EEOC well-deliberated guideline governed. Id.
80. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, ch. 630, subch. 13, S13-2 (FPM Supp. 990-2, May 6,
1975); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351(k)(2) (1982); Education Amend-
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982), noted by Brennan in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 157.
81. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 679 n.17 (1983).
82. PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4751. Senator Williams, a sponsor of the PDA,
stated: "The law must be changed to expressly prohibit pregnancy discrimination. If it is not
changed, countless women and their families will be forced to suffer unjust and severe economic,
social and psychological consequences." 123 CONG. REc. 7539 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams).
Congressman Hawkins also stated: "We must act now to guarantee that our progressive laws do not
become regressive by fact of interpretation in the courts." Id. at 7671.
83. PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4750.
Although recent attention has been focused on the coverage of disability benefits pro-
grams, the consequences of other discriminatory employment policies on pregnant women
and women in general has historically had a persistent and harmful effect upon their ca-
reers. Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are marginal workers.
Until a woman passes the child-bearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially
pregnant. Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these em-
ployment practices in addition to disability and medical benefits will go a long way toward
providing equal employment opportunities for women, the goal of Title VII ....
Id. at 4754-55.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). The PDA provides in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because
of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women af-
fected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
The PDA applies to all situations in which women are affected by pregnancy and extends to abor-
tion. While an employer may not fire or refuse to hire a woman who has had an abortion, an
11
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conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes
as other persons with a similar ability or inability to work."
The PDA compels employers who provide health care benefits to
employees to also provide benefits to female workers for pregnancy-
related disabilities. The Supreme Court in Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC"6 acknowledged the PDA's effect of overruling
Gilbert by citing legislative history favoring the argument of the dissent-
ing justices in Gilbert.7 Although Newport News extends the PDA's re-
quirements to include coverage for female employees, employer-provided
health care benefits for employees or their dependents is optional. How-
ever, any coverage for employees' wives must equal the coverage for fe-
male employees.88
The broader purpose of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act is to in-
sure protection to working women against differential treatment based on
pregnancy-related conditions.8 9 The House Report on the PDA explains
that all "[p]regnancy-based distinctions will be subject to the same scru-
tiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimination"90 in Title VII.
The House Report indicates that employers are not required to imple-
ment affirmative action programs for pregnant employees but are merely
to treat those employees equally. 91 Moreover, the protection extends to
all matters concerning the childbearing process, 92 such as medical and
disability benefits, leave provisions, and job reinstatement. The PDA
amplified the scope of Title VII to specifically address pregnancy dis-
crimination thereby significantly aiding women workers.
employer is not required to pay for abortions except where the mother's life would be endangered.
PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4755. The PDA has made it clear that, under Title VII,
"discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex."
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
86. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
87. Id. at 679 n.17.
88. Id. at 673-74. In an attempt to implement the PDA, the EEOC issued interpretive guide-
lines on sex discrimination and extended the protection of the PDA to apply to coverage for male
employees' dependents with pregnancy-related disablities. 44 Fed. Reg. 23805, 23807 (1979). If an
employer does not include dependents in health-care benefits, the employee's wife would not be
entitled to the same medical coverage for pregnancy as a female employee. Id.
89. PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4752.
90. Id.
91. Id. "The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work." Id.
92. Id. at 4753.
[Vol. 23:77
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E. Statutory Provisions, Regulatory Provisions, and Challenges
1. Statutory Provisions
Although the PDA does not require affirmative treatment for
pregnancy-related disabilities, several states have passed maternity leave
statutes to prevent discrimination caused by the lack of adequate mater-
nity leave policies.93 California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana,
and Wisconsin guarantee maternity leave by statute.94 Of these five
states, Connecticut95 and Montana 96 grant the most comprehensive guar-
antees of leave and job security. The essential provisions mandate a "rea-
sonable" unpaid leave for all pregnancy-related disabilities; these
provisions impose no maximum limitation on the length of the absence.97
In addition, the statutory provisions guarantee reinstatement to an
"equivalent" job upon return from leave.98 Presumably, reinstatement
includes the same compensation, status, responsibilities, and advance-
ment opportunities. Private employers must reinstate returning employ-
ees unless circumstances have changed to make it impossible or
unreasonable to do so. 99
The California maternity leave statute,100 at issue in Cal Fed, im-
poses a four-month limit on the duration of leave and does not explicitly
provide for reinstatement and retention of job status. Nevertheless, the
93. See Dowd, supra note 11 for comprehensive treatment of relevant statutes. See also Wald,
supra note 40 for a review of state statutory and common-law tools for redressing employment
discrimination.
94. Dowd, supra note 11, at 720 & n.93 (1986).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (West 1986). The Connecticut statute provides in
part:
(a) It shall be a discriminatory practie ...
(7) For an employer... (B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of
absence for disability resulting from her pregnancy... [or] (D) to fail or refuse to reinstate
the employee to her original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accu-
mulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signifying
her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circumstances
have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so ....
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (1987). Montana's maternity leave statute is similar to
Connecticut's except that the Montana statute includes: "It shall be unlawful for an employer.., to
(3) deny to the employee who is disabled as a result of pregnancy any compensation to which she is
entitled.., or (4) require that an employee take a mandatory maternity leave for an unreasonable
length of time." Id.
97. Reasonable leave is provided for the period of actual disability. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-60(a)(7)(B) (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-310(2) (1987).
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D) (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-311
(1987).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D) (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-311
(1987).
100. See CAL. GOV'T CODE, supra note 22 for the text of the California statute.
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California Fair Employment Housing Commission has declared that re-
instatement to a same or similar position is required unless the employer
demonstrates a business necessity as a bona fide occupational
qualification.01
Massachusetts and Wisconsin have statutes with significant varia-
tions. The Massachusetts statute guarantees female employees a maxi-
mum unpaid post-childbirth leave of eight weeks 0 2 and requires
reinstatement to the same or a similar position. 103 However, the statute
does not explicitly protect pre-leave seniority and benefits. Wisconsin's
provision defines "prohibited sex discrimination" as discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, maternity leave, or related medical
conditions."° Nevertheless, the degree of protection guaranteeing ma-
ternity leave is unclear, and reinstatement or status retention is not ex-
plicitly granted.10 5
Despite some lack of clarity in those states' affirmative statutes, wo-
men residents are afforded guarantees of leave and job security, except
perhaps in Wisconsin, and consequently have greater freedom and equal
employment opportunities.
2. Regulatory Provisions
Rather than enacting statutes granting maternity benefits, several
101. See California Fair Employment Housing Commission proposed regulation
7291.2(c)(2)(B). The regulation provides in part:
(B) The employee shall notify the employer as soon as she is ready to return and able to
return to work. Unless pursuant to a bona fide occupational qualification or business ne-
cessity, the employer shall reinstate the returning employee to her original, or a substan-
tially similar job, as defined in section 7291.2(b)(7), within a reasonable period of time.
Dowd, supra note 11, at 725 n.112. The parties in Cal Fed stipulated to the FEHA interpretation
regarding reinstatement.
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105(D) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). The Massachusetts
statute also extends this leave to female employees who take time off to adopt a baby. Id.
103. Id.
104. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(1) (West 1974 & Supp. 1986) provides in part:
Employment discrimination because of sex includes...
(c) Discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, maternity
leave or related medical conditions by engaging in ... [refusal to hire or employ, termina-
tion of employment, discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment], including, but not limited to, actions concerning fringe benefit programs
covering illnesses or disability.
Id.
105. Six jurisdictions have temporary disability statutes which provide income replacement to all
eligible employees: California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico.
Dowd, supra note 11, at 725-26 n.l 16.
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states have incorporated maternity leave guarantees in state agency regu-
lations or guidelines which are based on state antidiscrimination stat-
utes. 06 Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, and Washington
require leave for pregnancy-related disability. They also require job rein-
statement and maintenance of pre-leave seniority, fringe benefits, and job
status. 107 Reinstatement is not guaranteed, nor is maternity leave re-
quired, in Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Rhode Island. In these states, however, inadequate maternity leave may
be regarded as a violation of state antidiscrimination law if a challenger
can show an adverse impact on women.'0 8
3. The Challenge in Montana
Prior to the statutory challenge in Cal Fed, an employer challenged
the Montana Maternity Leave Act (MMLA)'1 9 in Miller-Wohl Co. v.
Commissioner of Labor & Industry."'° The controversy arose out of an
alleged discriminatory discharge of a newly-employed pregnant worker
who was denied sick leave. 1 1 Miller-Wohi charged that the MMLA
gave more favorable treatment to pregnancy-related disabilities than
other disabilities and was therefore preempted by Title VII. Miller-Wohl
also alleged that the MMLA violated the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause." 2 In spite of the statutory preemption and constitu-
tional challenges, the federal district court declared the MMLA valid. 1 1 3
In a subsequent action the Montana Supreme Court also upheld the
106. See id. at 730-33 for a comprehensive listing and explanation of provisions. State agency
regulations are more susceptible to alteration or discontinuance than statutes and therefore offer less
definite guarantees of maternity leave. Id. at 731 n.143.
107. Id. at 731.
108. Id. at 721 & n.95, 732 & n.148. Similarly, if an adverse impact on women due to lack of
reinstatement can be shown, perhaps the reasoning could be extended to such a discrimination
challenge.
109. The Montana Maternity Leave Act was repealed and renumbered in 1983. The sections at
issue in Miller-Wohl are now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310, 49-2-311 (1987).
110. 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally
Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and The Mean-
ing of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 513, 518-36 (1983) for a discussion of the
PDA's application to a state statute requiring affirmative treatment for pregnancy disability.
111. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1265 (D. Mont. 1981). The company policy provided no sick
leave or leave of absence during the first year of employment. The employee filed a complaint with
the Montana Department of Labor and Industries against Miller-Wohl charging that the no-leave
policy violated the maternity leave statute. Miller-Wohl then brought suit in federal district court.
Id.
112. Id. at 1266.
113. Thejudgment was vacated on jurisdictional grounds. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
1987]
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statute. 114
The Montana Supreme Court held that discharge from employment
because of pregnancy is an unlawful practice under Title VII and the
PDA because it constitutes gender-based discrimination."I5 Title VII de-
termines that women and men should be treated equally in employment
matters. Therefore, a discharge because of the effects of pregnancy is
discriminatory because it cannot affect men1 16 and because it disparately
impacts pregnant women. According to the State Commissioner of La-
bor and Industry, the MMLA did not discriminate in favor of pregnant
women because it actually protected both sexes by preserving the right of
husbands and wives to have a family without sacrificing the income of
one spouse.'n 7
Although the Miller- Wohl decision upheld affirmative treatment of
pregnant employees, it divided the feminist legal community over the
meaning of equality for women.' 18 Attorneys who were active in passing
the PDA took the position that any deviation from treating men and
women alike is dangerous for women and is contrary to Title VII.1 9
Proponents of the opposite view supported the affirmative action ap-
proach of the MMLA as essential in changing institutions based on a
male prototype so that equality could actually be achieved. According to
these attorneys, merely treating the sexes equally in pregnancy-related
disabilities results in inequality for women.1
20
IV. THE DECISION
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act defines the appropriate legal
standard for evaluating pregnancy discrimination. Because Congres-
sional intent must be ascertained to determine whether federal law will
preempt a state statute,121 the Court in Cal Fed examined the legislative
114. Miller-Wohl, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984).
115. Id. at 1251.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1253.
118. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 110, at 515.
119. Id. The Montana court noted that in the views of the amici (ACLU, NOW, and the League
of Women Voters) the MMLA represented protectionist legislation that hurt rather than helped
women and kept them in marginal jobs, yet these groups desired to preserve the MMLA by judicial
extension of benefits to all sexes. 692 P.2d at 1253. Miller- Wohl was pending before the Supreme
Court when Cal Fed was decided. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d
1243 (Mont. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 84-1545).
120. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 110, at 515.
121. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 689.
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history of the PDA to clarify congressional intent.1 22 Based on this his-
tory and on consideration of the contemporary labor environment, the
Court concluded that the PDA does not proscribe affirmative aid to
those disabled by pregnancy. 123 Therefore, the California statute permit-
ting favorable benefits for pregnancy disability did not violate the federal
standard. Because the Court found common goals of equal employment
opportunity for women in Title VII and California's disability statute, it
found no conflict which would justify preemption.124
The Court in Cal Fed was divided on whether Section 708 of the
PDA or Section 1104 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied in preempting
state fair employment laws. The majority found that Sections 708 and
1104 allowed only a narrow scope of preemption, which reflected con-
gressional deference to state antidisdrimination laws enacted to achieve
Title VII's equal employment opportunity goals.'12 ' Finding that the
PDA supported a narrow interpretation of preemptive provisions, the
majority looked to whether the PDA prohibits the affirmative action of
reinstatement provisions. 126
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens agreed that the California statute
was consistent with the PDA; therefore, it was unnecessary to determine
whether either section applied. 27 Justice Scalia, however, considered
only Section 708, which prohibits preemption unless state law requires or
permits an act outlawed by the PDA. 121 Scalia further stated in his con-
currence that the Court exceeded its jurisdiction in prematurely inter-
preting the PDA; the Justice also noted that the Constitution prohibits
the Supreme Court's rendering of advisory opinions.' 29
The dissent argued that the PDA requires complete neutrality and
forbids all beneficial treatment of pregnancy.13 0 The dissenting Justices
found that Section 708 did not save the California Code section because
the statute authorized employers to engage in an employment practice
which violated Title VII.13 1
122. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
125. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 690.
126. Id. at 690-91.
127. Id. at 696 n.1.
128. Id. at 697. Scalia found no basis for preemption because the California statute neither
requires nor allows any refusal to accord equal treatment. Id.
129. Id. at 697-98. Scalia believes the Court should not render advisory opinions by interpreting
an Act such as the PDA for the convenience of a state or its employers. Id. at 698.
130. Id. at 698-702.
131. Id. at 702.
1987]
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Not surprisingly, the dissenting Justices in Cal Fed constituted the
majority in the earlier Gilbert decision, which included Rehnquist,
White, and Powell. In Gilbert, these Justices found that an employee
insurance program's failure to cover pregnancy did not constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII because the insurance "package" covered
the exact same categories of risk for both sexes and as such was facially
nondiscriminatory.' 32 Only Justice Blackmun changed positions by join-
ing the majority in Cal Fed after having joined in part the majority opin-
ion in Gilbert. In Gilbert, Blackmun stated that the exclusion of
disability coverage for pregnancy was not a per se violation of Title VII
because the challenger failed to prove a discriminatory effect. 133 Justice
Blackmun refused, however, to join the Gilbert majority's inference that
effect is not a controlling factor in a Title VII case;134 therefore, his posi-
tion with the majority in Cal Fed could be expected because the Cal Fed
Court focused on the effect of the California statute on women's employ-
ment opportunities.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting in Gilbert, formed the
majority in Cal Fed along with O'Connor and Blackmun (Stevens and
Scalia concurred). In Gilbert, the dissent found that the majority's sug-
gestion that a pregnancy classification is not gender-related was offensive
to common sense.' 35 Furthermore, the dissenting Justices rejected the
purported neutral criteria used to explain exclusion of pregnancy from
the company insurance policy.' 36 By looking at the burdened role of
contemporary working women, as they did in Gilbert, these Justices in
Cal Fed found that the objective of Title VII was to assure equal employ-
ment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory policies which have
have had the effect of disadvantaging women by sexually stratifying the
job environment.' 37  The majority in Cal Fed determined that the
California statute, by "taking pregnancy into account," gives women the
same opportunity as men to have a family and retain their employment
status, 38 thereby effecting a complete change in the Court's approach to
132. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976).
133. Id at 146.
134. Id. Blackmun has been noted as being in the center of the Court but moving more in the
liberal direction since his decision in Roe v. Wade. See Shea, Sandra Day O'Connor- Woman, Law-
yer, Justice: Her First Four Terms on the Supreme Court, 55 UMKC L. REv. 1, 31 (1986).
135. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 160.
137. CalFed, 107 S. Ct. at 693-94 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 694. It follows that disallowance of the affirmative statute would have the effect of
perpetuating less than equal employment opportunity for women.
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equal employment for women. The Gilbert dissent's evolution into the
Cal Fed majority can therefore be categorized with those dissents which
Justice Hughes called an appeal "to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct




A. Equal Employment Opportunity Goal of Title VII
1. PDA is a Congressional Guarantee
The passage of the PDA in 1978 indicated Congress' intention to
grant pregnant women a guarantee against policies that have a disparate
impact on them."" In the definitional first clause added to Title VII by
the PDA, Congress clarified sex discrimination to include pregnancy and
its related conditions."14 The Court in Newport News found that the ad-
dition of pregnancy to the sex-discrimination definition reflected Con-
gressional disapproval of the Gilbert decision.14 As in its Newport News
analysis, the Cal Fed Court emphasized Congressional intent.
The Court in Cal Fed examined the language of the PDA and the
legislative history behind its passage.143 The history indicates that Con-
gress had found evidence of discrimination against pregnancy in disabil-
ity and health insurance programs like those in Gilbert and Satty."
Representative Chisholm's support of the PDA "because it affords some
41 percent of this Nation's labor force some greater degree of protection
139. See R. HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 102 (1980)
(quoting C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928)). See also Douglas,
In Defense of Dissent, in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM INSIDE 51 (A. Westin ed. 1961)
(Justice Douglas recognizes the role of the judiciary in attempting to reconcile diverse groups in
society and notes the effect of dissenting opinions on the character of government and future of the
country.).
140. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
142. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. at 678-79, cited in Cal
Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 691. See PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4751-52, stating that Congress
has "clarified its original intent" to eradicate the "intolerable potential trend" started by the
Supreme Court in Gilbert.
143. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 692.
144. Id. at n.18 (citing Discrin)ination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977, Hearings on S. 995
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
31-33, 113-21, 307-10 (1977)). See, eg., 124 CONG. REc. 38574 (1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin)
(stating subcommittee "learned of the many instances of discrimination against pregnant workers, as
we learned of the hardships this discrimination brought to the women and their families ....").
19871
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and security without fear or reprisal due to their decision to bear chil-
dren. . ." demonstrated Congress' intent to provide relief for working
women by ending discrimination toward pregnant women. 145 Represen-
tative Tsongas stated that the bill was necessary to "put an end to an
unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to choose between fam-
ily and career-clearly a function of sex bias in the law."'146 Policies
which force women to choose between family and career have a disparate
impact on women when men are not forced to make the same choice.
2. Pregnancy Discrimination Remedies
Continuing its analysis of the language and intent of the PDA, the
Cal Fed Court found that the second clause of the PDA illustrates how
pregnancy discrimination can be remedied.' 47 If pregnancy is to be
treated the same as other disabilities, an employer's benefit program for
disabilities, leaves of absence, and seniority must include pregnancy on
the same basis with other disabilities.1 48 Under this "same treatment"
interpretation of the PDA, disability programs which exclude pregnancy
from coverage must be remedied. 149
Analysis of the judicial context of the PDA supports the "same
treatment" interpretation. Congress enacted the PDA to counter
Supreme Court decisions which allowed employers to exclude pregnancy
from disability coverage. 150 Although pregnancy is akin to other disabil-
ities in affecting ability to work, the Court had singled out its cost, pre-
dictability, voluntariness, and uniqueness to justify exclusion by an
employer.' 5' Congress, however, intended to prohibit all pregnancy dis-
crimination, including employment policies which adversely affect preg-
nant workers, such as termination, lack of reinstatement, and loss of
145. 124 CONG. Rac. 21440 (1978) (statement of Rep. Chisolm) (quoted in Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct.
at 692 n.19).
146. 124 CONG. REC. 21442 (1978) (statement of Rep. Tsongas) (quoted in Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at
692 n.19).
147. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
148. PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4753. "This bill would prevent employers from
treating pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions in a manner different from their treat-
ment of other disabilities." Id. Fringe benefit programs also must treat women affected by preg-
nancy-related conditions equally with respect to other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work. Id. at 4752.
149. The PDA requirement that pregnancy receive the same treatment as other disabilties was
intended as a means to insure that pregnancy would not be excluded from a list of disabilities. Note,
Sexual Equality under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690, 719 (1983).
150. See PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4750-51, 4754-55.
151. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (pregnancy is a voluntary and de-
sired condition); id. at 139 (pregnancy-related disabilities unique to women); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496 (1974) (cost factor).
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Congressional intent in passing the PDA reflects the district court's
opinion in Gilbert v. General Electric Co. 153 The district court held that
pregnancy should be treated like any other disability in an existing
disability benefit program, 54 yet the court additionally stated that preg-
nancy is a unique disability that distinguishes women from men. 55 The
lower court further stated that this distinction was not sufficient to sup-
port the argument that compensation for pregnancy disabilities is cost-
prohibitive."5 6 Therefore, pregnancy disabilities should be compensated
in order to "sexually equalize employment opportunity."
157
The first clause of the PDA158 bars policies that penalize women
because of pregnancy. When the second clause,1 59 which requires same
treatment, is added to the first clause, pregnancy is afforded the same
treatment as other disabilities in employee benefit plans. Therefore, an
employer is prohibited from discharging an employee because she is
pregnant, regardless of how a non-pregnant employee is treated.
1 60
Prohibiting discharge is valid when the employee would not be fired but
for her pregnancy. 1
61
The Supreme Court in Cal Fed found no ambiguity in the PDA.
Justice Marshall's opinion integrated the two clauses, finding that the
second clause serves to illustrate how pregnancy discrimination is to be
152. PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4752.
153. 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125
(1976).
154. Id. at 385.
155. Id. at 383.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
159. "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes ...." Id.
160. Note, supra note 149, at 696. See also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811,
817-19 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when employee terminated because of pregnancy, employer can incur Title
VII violation as much by lack of an adequate leave policy, causing employment discrimination trace-
able to gender, as by unequal application of an existing policy); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981) (employer violation of state statute because of
inadequate leave policy resulting in dismissal of pregnant employee), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th
Cir. 1982).
161. Note, supra note 149, at 696. The EEOC has declared: "Where the termination of an
employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or
no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of
one sex and is not justified by business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 10(c) (1986). This provision
became effective in 1979.
1987]
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remedied. 162 Therefore, the PDA prohibits certain discriminatory treat-
ment but does not limit affirmative remedial action. 163
3. State Affirmative Action
The Court in Cal Fed concluded that the drafters of the PDA did
not intend to prohibit state affirmative action. 164 In fact, Congress ac-
knowledged several state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit pregnancy
discrimination. 65 Three of the states required employers to provide rea-
sonable leave to pregnant employees.1
66
Numerous senators referred to state laws in the Congressional
debates. One senator remarked that several state legislatures have cho-
sen to mandate certain types of benefits for pregnant employees. 167 An-
other senator declared that nondiscrimination law affecting pregnancy is
supported by twenty-five states; these states have implemented their own
fair employment practices laws to prohibit sex discrimination based on
conditions related to pregnancy. 68
Congress showed no intent to supersede the affirmative state laws
but merely stated that it would not require preferential treatment of preg-
nant employees.1 69 Based on Congressional acknowledgement of affirma-
tive state laws, the Court found that the California statute would remain
effective under the PDA.
162. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1987). "The meaning of
the first clause is not limited by the specific language in the second clause, which explains the appli-
cation of the general principle to women employees." Id. (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 n.14 (1983)).
163. Id. at 691-92. The Court in Cal Fed cited with approval the court of appeals' conclusion
that Congress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id. (quoting Cal Fed, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
164. Id. at 692-93.
165. Id. at 693.
166. Id. The Court cited the Connecticut, Montana, and Massachusetts statutes which were
mentioned in the House and Senate Reports, indicating that Congress was aware of the statutory
provisions.
167. 123 CONG. REC. 29387 (1977) (statement of Sen. Javits). He acknowledged that the PDA
does not go so far as to mandate certain benefits, but it instead adopts equality of treatment based on
benefit programs already in existence. Id. Prohibition of existing statutes was not mentioned.
168. 123 CONG. REC. 29662 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also PDA Legislative His-
tory, supra note 76, at 4751. "The view of nondiscrimination incorporated in [the PDA] is sup-
ported by the fact that almost half of the States presently interpret their own fair employment
practices laws to prohibit sex discrimination based on pregnancy and childbirth." Id.
169. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 692 (noting PDA Legislative History, supra note 76, at 4752). The
PDA does not require institution of new programs where none exist. PDA Legislative History,
supra note 76, at 4752. The dissent found that Congressional acknowledgment of state antidis-
crimination laws did not support an inference that preferential treatment would be allowed under
the PDA. The dissent argued that the House considered the state statutes in the context of a health
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B. Considering Pregnancy in the Current Labor Environment
The contemporary labor environment is replete with record num-
bers of women in the labor force. Ninety percent of these working wo-
men are of childbearing age.170 Ninety-three percent of women between
fifteen and forty-four are likely to have at least one child,171 which means
that four of five female workers will probably become pregnant during
their working years.
For women to realize equality in employment opportunity, the uni-
queness of pregnancy requires that women be treated differently than
men. Otherwise, women cannot be free to have families without fear of
losing their jobs or at least their employment status. 172 Larson and Lar-
son, employment discrimination authorities, note the "apparent paradox
of requiring inequality to produce equality"' 173 of employment opportu-
nity. They suggest that "when the two sexes are dissimilar in that one
sex exclusively possesses a trait which the other, without exception, does
not possess, and when that trait has a bearing on employability, it is a
differentiation based on sex to treat the two sexes similarly as to that
trait." 1
74
The Court in Cal Fed noted the importance of accounting for preg-
nancy in establishing disability policies that are congruent with women's
roles in the current labor environment. 17 ' The majority noted that the
end products of discrimination demand due consideration of the unique-
ness of individuals "disadvantaged" by pregnancy. 176 Justice Stevens'
concurrence supported the majority's position that the PDA allows some
insurance cost discussion rather than in a preemption context and that the Senate did not analyze the
statutory provisions but merely listed states requiring coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities.
Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 700 (white, J., dissenting).
170. See Silverman, supra note 7.
171. S. KAMERMAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND LEAVES: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL REvIEv 7 (1980).
172. "If a woman cannot choose whether to utilize her reproductive capacity, she is not a free
moral agent, let alone the equal of a man." Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case ofPregnancy, 1
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 23 n.125 (1985). Professor Kay proposes a model of equality that takes
account of biological reproductive sex differences rather than characteristics of sexual identity. The
model is "furthered by, but is not conditioned upon, a woman's having the legal right and the effec-
tive power to control her reproductive capacity." Id. But see E. WoLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE
RIGHITS OF WOMEN 16, 25-30, 103-37 (1980) for a bivalent concept of equality. Wolgast uses biolog-
ical reproductive sex differences as the foundation for sexual identity and consequently creates a
"separate but equal" model of social differences. The bivalent view has been criticized for failing to
distinguish childbearing from child-rearing. Koehane, Feminist Scholarship and Human Nature, 93
ETHICS 102, 108-11 (1982).
173. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 38.22, at 8-31 (1985).
174. Id. (emphasis in original).
175. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
176. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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preferential treatment of pregnancy. 7 7 Although preferential treatment
may mean additional cost, the Court noted in Newport News that cost
differentiation is not recognized as justification for discrimination. 178
Equality for pregnant employees therefore requires measurement in
terms of employment opportunity, rather than necessary costs. 179
C. Common Goal Identified in the PDA and the California Statute
State laws are subject to preemption if they actually conflict with
federal law and require or permit an act that would be an unlawful em-
ployment practice.' Therefore, the Court in Cal Fed found that federal
law would preempt the California statute if the state statute required em-
ployers to violate the purpose and spirit of Title VII.'8 The purpose of
Title VII is to achieve equality of employment opportunities, which has
been extended by the PDA to include equality for pregnant workers. 82
The Court in Cal Fed found that the California statute had the same
goal as Title VII of promoting equal employment opportunity.18 3 By re-
quiring reinstatement after "reasonable" leave, the statute is narrowly
drawn to cover only the disability period and provides only a qualified
right of reinstatement." 4 Additionally, the statute did not reflect
"archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of
pregnant workers,"'8 5 which would be inconsistent with Title VII's goal.
In striking down the statutory challenge, the Court stated that com-
pliance with both the state statute and Title VII is theoretically possible
because employers are not prohibited from granting comparable benefits
177. Id. at 696. The dissent found that the PDA's second clause mandates that pregnant em-
ployees be awarded only the same treatment as non-pregnant employees with no preferential treat-
ment allowed. Id. at 698.
178. Newport News, 462 U.S. 669, 685 n.26 (1983) (quoting City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978)).
179. "A decision invalidating the California statute will condemn women to a perpetually infer-
ior position in the labor market." Brief of California Women Lawyers; Child Care Law Center;
Jessica McDowell; Lawyers Committee for Urban Affairs; Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund; Women Lawyers' Association of Los Angeles; and Women's Lawyers of Sacra-
mento, Amici Curiae at 5, Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494). The amici in Cal Fed were
split on the issues similar to the amici in Miller-WohL. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying
text.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
181. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 689.
182. Id. at 693.
183. Id. at 693-94. See Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, 10 PAC. LJ. 247, 463
(1979).
184. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 694. Reinstatement was contingent upon the job's availability in light
of business necessity. Id.
185. Id. The statute is unlike earlier protectionist labor legislation which hindered rather than
furthered equal employment opportunities for women. See supra notes 4 & 119.
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to other non-pregnant disabled employees."8 6 Pregnant workers would
therefore not be treated preferentially over other non-pregnant persons
with similar capabilities. 18 7  The statute merely establishes minimal ben-
efits that must be provided to pregnant workers.18 By upholding legisla-
tion which ultimately will have the effect of equalizing employment
opportunities, the Court has demonstrated its willingness to defer to wo-
men's uniqueness as childbearers in an environment where the majority
of women of childbearing age are employed. The decision therefore re-
flects Justice Holmes' view of evolving law as an adaptation to the "felt
necessities of the time." 189
D. Implications of the Decision
Cal Fed sets a precedent for interpretation of the PDA and confir-
mation of the states' affirmative treatment of pregnancy disabilities. 9 '
By defining obligations of Title VII employers and rights of employees in
states with affirmative statutes, the decision reduces uncertainty concern-
ing the application of EEOC guidelines. Other states may be motivated
to pass legislation to provide preferential treatment for pregnant employ-
ees, as well, especially larger industrial states with a liberal record of
work regulations.' 91
186. Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. at 695. The petitioners argued that the extension of benefits to other
employees is inappropriate because the Court has declined to rewrite underinclusive statutes that
violate the Equal Protection Clause. This argument was misplaced because the Court did not find
that the statute was invalid. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. However, the Court noted that the statute could only be extended to cover other em-
ployees if a court chose such a remedial option. Id.
189. Holmes felt the life of the law is not logic but experience and that the rules to govern man
are developed from the necessities of the time in addition to moral and political theories, public
policy, and judicial prejudices. D.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
190. The decision in Miller- Wohl was vacated and remanded to the Montana Supreme Court for
further consideration in light of Cal Fed. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 107
S. Ct. 919 (1987).
191. Rosenweig, Maternity Leave Statutes, SMALL BUSINESs REPORT, April 1987, at 79; see also
Stewart, Equal Treatment for Pregnant Workers, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1987, at 45 (quoting Robin
Conrad of the Chamber of Commerce). Since the Cal Fed decision, many states have considered
maternity leave legislation; Tennessee has passed a statute which guarantees leave in some circum-
stances. See HB 1002 (1987 P.L. Ch. 373) (cited in [Current Developments] Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 40 at 1503 (Aug. 18, 1987)). Despite support by Governor Bellmon, a parental leave bill was
defeated in Oklahoma on March 23, 1987. The Oklahoma bill required employers of 15 or more
employees to provide unpaid parental leave for up to three months, but it did not require employers
to provide health insurance coverage for pregnancy. The bill did not include reinstatement guaran-
tees. H.R. Rep. No. 1338, 41st Okla. Leg., 1st Sess. (1987). To enhance passage of the bill, a section
granting leave to new fathers had been removed and workers compensation benefits for pregnant
workers had also been deleted. In defeating the bill, opponents charged that it would create a hard-
ship for small busineses and would be detrimental to the state's business climate. Maternity Leave
Bill Defeated, Tulsa World, Mar. 24, 1987, at 1B, col. 4 [hereinafter Bill Defeated].
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The decision in Cal Fed will increase the likelihood that proposed
federal legislation requiring parental leave will be adopted. "The Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1986," presently before the House of Repre-
sentatives, would require companies with fifteen or more employees to
establish policies granting unpaid leave to both mothers and fathers.1 92
A sample of major United States industrial, financial, and service compa-
nies in 1984 indicated that barely half of the firms offered unpaid mater-
nity leaves and less than eight percent offered paid leaves. 193 The
proposed bill provides up to 18 weeks of job-protected leave during a
twenty-four-month period to care for either a baby or newly-adopted
child.194 Because the Court has indicated the necessity of equalizing em-
ployment opportunities for women in the current labor environment, 195
Congress may be encouraged to enact a national maternity policy as
other industrialized nations have done. 196 Women who choose to have
both a family and a career would then have greater opportunity to ad-
vance in their employment on an equal basis with other workers.
Conversely, positions in the primary job market could become even
more difficult for women to achieve. 197 Employers, financially burdened
by granting pregnancy disability leave and consequently incurring the
costs of training temporary replacement employees, will be less likely to
hire women of childbearing age. 198  Some commentators have found,
192. H.R. 4300, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986); reintroduced, H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
193. Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381,
384 (1984-85) (citing Dullen, Conference Discusses Parental Job Leave, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985 at
Cl1, col. 2). See also "Policies on Leave from Work," Personnel Policies Forum (BNA) PPF Survey
No. 136 (June 1983) (discussion of details of maternity leave provisions covering plant/service, of-
fiee/clerical, and management/exempt employee groups).
194. Fassihi, How Much Time For Him?, Tulsa Tribune, Mar. 5, 1987, at 1B, col. 3. The
strongest opposition to the bill is expected from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which also opposed
the California statute. Id. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Support of
The Petitioners, Amicus Curiae, Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494).
195. Various sources consider it unlikely that the bill will pass. See Rosenweig, supra note 191.
George Mason University predicts that the bill has a 51% chance of passing in the House but only a
36% chance of passing in the Senate. (NEXIS, Billeast).
196. Seventy-five countries, including every industrialized country except the United States (as
well as numerous developing countries), have a form of statutory maternity leave. See MATERNITY
POLICIES, supra note I at 14. Sweden is the only country to date to extend the benefit to fathers. Id.
at 16. Benefits range from a minimum paid leave of 12 weeks and cash benefits to job protected
leaves for at least one year or as long as two years. Id. at 15, 19. National health insurance provides
maternity benefits in most of the countries; however, sixteen countries without national health insur-
ance nevertheless provide benefits. Id. at 14.
197. See Lewin, supra note 20, at 23, col. 2. An Oklahoma state representative predicted that
women of childbearing age would be "shunned by the business community" if they are afforded such
preferential treatment. Bill Defeated, supra note 191.
198. The Chamber of Commerce estimates that an employer would incur additional costs for 18
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however, that these costs may be overestimated and employers would
benefit from a happier, healthier, and more productive workforce. 199
In addition to financial burdens, multijurisdictional employers also
face problems of compliance in dealing with differences in state legisla-
tion.2" Other problems were anticipated in the amici brief filed by the
ACLU and the League of Women Voters.20 1 Those groups argued that
providing special benefits for pregnant workers permanently marginalizes
their role as workers by placing women outside the main stream of the
labor force.202
In another early 1987 decision, Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Re-
lations Commission,203 the Court allowed the states substantial discretion
in treatment of pregnant workers so long as treatment does not disadvan-
tage workers solely because of their pregnancy.2' Although affirmative
treatment was allowed under the California statute in Cal Fed, the Court
allowed Missouri in Wimberly to deny unemployment compensation to
any worker (pregnant or not) who leaves a job without good cause due to
conditions unconnected with the work or employer.20
However, despite allowing discretion to the states, the Court re-
emphasized its determination to help women achieve equality of employ-
ment by allowing an employer in a recent California case to promote a
woman over a more-qualified man.206 The affirmative action was deemed
weeks of parental leave for a word-processing employee of $1747 in St. Louis, $3363 in Houston, and
$5186 in D.C. See Stewart, supra note 191, at 45.
199. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 COL. L. Rav. 1118, 1175 (1986) (citing Bruno & Vehling, Day Care on the Job, NEws-
WEEK, Sept. 2, 1985, at 59-60; Lang, Research: Child Care Policies, YALE MAGAZINE, Sept. 1985,
at 42-45). The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, supra note 192, provides for a study of the
optimal way to fund paid leave before any mandatory paid leave provisions will be enacted.
200. Stewart, supra note 191, at 45.
201. Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union, The League of Women Voters of the United
States, The League of Women Voters of California, The National Women's Political Caucus, and
The Coal Employment Project, Amici Curiae at 9, Cal Fed, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (No. 85-494).
202. Id.
203. 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987). The Court held that the provision of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982), which mandates that no person shall be denied compensation
under state law because of pregnancy, does not mandate preferential treatment for women who leave
work because of pregnancy. It only prohibits a state from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable
treatment. 107 S. Ct. at 828.
204. Id.
205. The Missouri statute defines "leaving for good cause" narrowly; therefore, persons taking
leave may forfeit benefits unless the reasons for leaving are job-related. Id. at 824.
206. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). The male employee's test score
was higher. Id. The district court found the male worker more qualified for the position and that
Ms. Joyce's gender was the determinative factor in her selection. Id. at 1449.
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necessary to achieve a workforce that reflects the proportion of minori-
ties and women in the labor force.20 7 The Court also upheld a local Ro-
tary Club's admission of women members despite the organizational
policy prohibiting females.2"' The Court held that the state's interest in
eliminating discrimination against women and allowing them equal ac-
cess to acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts justified any
slight infringement on members' rights of association.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra upheld a state's right to fashion and adminis-
ter employment policies which allow preferential treatment for those dis-
abled by pregnancy. By considering congressional intent behind the
PDA, the Court found a common goal in Title VII and the California
statute, which is to achieve equal employment opportunity for women.
If women are to achieve equality in the workplace, treating pregnant
workers "the same" as other workers may not be sufficient to equalize
women's employment opportunities when women are not similarly situ-
ated because of the burden of pregnancy. Therefore, the Court justified
the statute's preferential treatment. Additionally, the statute does not
prevent employers from granting benefits to other disabled workers to
prevent discrimination.
In the early pregnancy decisions, the Court's attitude was seen by
some as punishing pregnancy by failing to recognize pregnancy discrimi-
nation as sex discrimination. The Court's views have evolved to the
point that pregnancy is now seen as a biological reality affecting women's
employment opportunities with enough significance to warrant consider-
ation in terms of the contemporary labor environment. Although the
Cal Fed decision was based on the preemption issue, the decision has
precedential value for affirmative treatment for pregnancy-related
disability.
Beverly A. Stewart
207. The Court found the agency's plan to be consistent with Title VII and an embodiment of
what voluntary employer action could accomplish to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Id.
at 1458-59.
208. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987)
(unanimous decision) (local Rotary Club action complied with the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL.
CIv. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 1982)).
209. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
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